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After years of dormancy, the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) suddenly
plays a prominent role in agency policymaking. Under the CRA, Congress has
overturned multiple major regulations adopted by the Obama Administration,1
and the campaign continues. The next stage in this rollback appears to be a
program of invalidating agency guidance documents, policy statements, and
interpretations. That possibility has frightened many observers because it
appears to expose an enormous additional amount of policymaking to CRA
attack. We argue that, to the contrary, using the CRA in an attempt to overrule
agency policy statements and interpretations will be fruitless, and the effort
will, in the long run, reveal important limits on the CRA.
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1
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017) (disapproving rule, Disclosure of Payments
by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (July 27, 2016) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240 and 249b), requiring disclosure of payments to foreign governments by
resource extraction issuers for oil and gas development); Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15
(2017) (disapproving rule, Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of
2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,702 (Dec. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 421), adding
certain requirements to report to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System).
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I. A CRA PRIMER
The CRA was part of the Contract with America, the program of
reform—or overhaul—under which Republicans swept into power in Congress
in 1994. The CRA requires every agency that promulgates a rule to submit a
report on it to Congress, in which the agency includes a copy of the rule, a brief
summary of the rule, and the intended effective date of the rule.2 A rule cannot
“take effect” until the agency has transmitted this report.3 At the same time, the
agency must also send to the Government Accountability Office a copy of the
rule’s cost-benefit analysis, its analysis or certification under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and other similar analyses.4
The report gives Congress an opportunity to pass a joint resolution
disapproving the rule. This joint resolution is a law like any other; it requires
the President’s signature or a vote overriding a veto. A rule that is the subject
of a disapproval resolution is essentially nullified; the resolution says the rule
“shall have no force or effect.”5 The CRA gives two special privileges to
disapproval resolutions. First, an agency apparently cannot resurrect a
disapproved rule: “A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue)”
thanks to a CRA resolution “may not be reissued in substantially the same
form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be
issued.”6 Second, for a limited time window, a CRA resolution receives
expedited treatment and an exemption from certain legislative procedures—
most significantly from Senate filibusters.7
2

5 U.S.C. § 801(a).
If a rule is “major,” it cannot take effect until at least 60 days after the agency sends the
report. § 801(a)(3).
4
§ 801(a)(1)(B).
5
§ 802(a).
6
§ 801(b)(2).
7
§ 802(c), (d).
3
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To receive these benefits, a CRA resolution must have a specific, simple
form. It resolves “[t]hat Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the [agency
in question] relating to [the title or subject of the rule at issue], and such rule shall
have no force or effect.”8 It cannot say anything else. In addition, a CRA
resolution must be introduced during a window beginning “on the date on which
the report” is received or the date the rule was published in the Federal Register,
whichever is later, and ending on the 60th day afterwards.9
The principal function of the CRA is to make it easier, in a transfer of
power between political parties, for the incoming majority party to undo the
regulatory policies of the outgoing party. The CRA is chiefly useful only if the
incoming President is of the same party as majorities in both Houses of
Congress. If either House majority is of the outgoing party, and thus an
opponent of the incoming party, that House is fairly unlikely to approve a CRA
resolution. If the President is of the outgoing party, the President is unlikely to
sign the resolution. Of course, Congress could overrule a veto. But if there were
enough votes to do that, the CRA’s procedural benefits (such as avoiding the
filibuster) would be worth little—and probably not worth the straitjacket that
the CRA places on the content of a disapproval resolution. Thus, a CRA
resolution is unlikely unless the Presidency changes parties and the new
President is of the same party as majorities in both Houses.
The CRA resets the clock with respect to rules in the last months of a
congressional session, which allows the incoming Congress the ability to undo
a substantial volume of past policy. If an agency submits a rule less than 60
Senate session days or House legislative days before the end of a session, the
time for joint resolutions begins in the next session, on the 15th session day or
legislative day.10 This 60-session-day period captures far more than so-called
“midnight rules” (the common nickname for rules that an outgoing administration issues in its final days).11 At the end of the Obama Administration, the
60th session day before the end of the session was in mid-June.12
8

§ 802(a).
Id. Days on which either House of Congress is adjourned for more than three days during
a session don’t count toward the 60 days. A resolution gets expedited, filibuster-free
treatment only during the 60-day window.
10
§ 802(e)(2).
11
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-183, OMB SHOULD WORK WITH AGENCIES
TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT COMPLIANCE DURING AND AT THE END OF
PRESIDENTS’ TERMS 1 (2018) defines “midnight” as the last 120 days, and it provides data
about midnight rulemaking from the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations.
12
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10437, AGENCY
FINAL RULES SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER JUNE 13, 2016, MAY BE SUBJECT TO DISAPPROVAL
BY THE 115TH CONGRESS 1 (2016).
9
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Before 2017, only one CRA resolution became law: disapproval of a
Labor Department rule on ergonomics.13 Accordingly, there has been no case
in which an agency adopted a rule that was arguably “substantially the same”
as a previously disapproved rule. There has also been no case elaborating what
it means for a rule to have “no force and effect”—a phrase, we will argue
below, that is narrower than it at first appears. The real effect of CRA resolutions remains to be seen.
II. THE NEW INITIATIVE: CRA DISAPPROVAL OF GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
In the Trump Presidency, CRA resolutions have become almost
routine. Fifteen of them have passed as of April 2019, disapproving rules
ranging from an amendment to federal procurement rules to a consumerprotection rule restricting the use of arbitration clauses.14
Nearly all of those rules were “legislative” rules—creating rights and
obligations, and adopted through notice and comment, published in the Federal
Register, and accompanied with the full panoply of rulemaking such as
Regulatory Flexibility Act compliance.15 The latest initiative has been to use
the CRA to overturn agency guidance documents. The Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) concluded, in response to an inquiry from
Senator Pat Toomey, that a particular guidance document that federal banking
regulators issued regarding leveraged lending was a rule for purposes of the
CRA.16 The guidance in question informed depository institutions about the
regulators’ expectations of how institutions will manage the risk of leveraged
lending, and identified conduct that would likely lead regulators to take
supervisory action. The GAO acknowledged that the document was only a
general statement of enforcement policy and did not establish any binding
norms. Yet, the GAO noted, general statements of policy are “rules” under the
13

Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001). President Obama vetoed five CRA resolutions
during his tenure. See DAVIS & BETH, supra note 12, at 1.
14
GAO has a list on its website. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/
legal/congressional-review-act/faq [https://perma.cc/9GYZ-VCDA] (last visited Mar. 16,
2019).
15
See Truckers United for Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 139 F.3d 934, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (describing hallmarks of a legislative rule); Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Comm.
Commission, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the requirement to issue an
impact statement “under § 604 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act . . . applies only to legislative
rules”).
16
Letter from Susan A. Poling, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to Senator
Pat Toomey, U.S. Senate (Oct. 19, 2017) (on file with U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687879.pdf.)
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Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) definition, and the CRA incorporates
the APA definition. So it follows that a general statement of policy “is a rule
subject to the requirements of CRA.”17
There has been no attempt to invalidate the leveraged lending guidance.
But shortly after that opinion, the GAO reached a similar conclusion about a
guidance document that has many more enemies: the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s statement about discrimination risks in indirect auto
lending.18 The auto lending guidance, issued in 2013, expressed the Bureau’s
view that certain indirect auto lenders have obligations under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”); it points out that these lenders may be liable under
ECOA if their own conduct is discriminatory; and it points out ways a lender
can mitigate its risk of ECOA liability.19 Many politicians, as well as many
auto lenders, have sharply criticized the auto lending guidance since it first
came out.20 On May 21, 2018, the guidance became the first guidance
document to be the subject of a successful CRA resolution.21
The auto lending guidance may turn out to be an anomaly. It had
inspired an unusually high degree of anger, a greater amount than most rules
of any kind. But the GAO’s interpretation of guidance documents as rules
opens up a wide range of past policymaking for potential CRA action because
the statutory timeline is tolled until a document is sent to Congress. Until the
GAO’s recent decisions, it is likely agencies usually did not transmit guidance
documents to Congress for CRA review.22 The normal course was to submit
17

Id.
Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to
Senator Pat Toomey, U.S. Senate (Dec. 5, 2017) (on file with U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Off., https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf.)
19
Bulletin re: indirect auto lending and compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/guidance/supervisory-guidance/bulletin-indirect-auto-lending-compliance/
[https://perma.cc/KS2Q-T3A8] [hereinafter “Bulletin”].
20
See, e.g., Nat’l. Auto. Dealers Ass’n. and Nat’l. Auto. of Minority Auto. Dealers, NADA
and NAMAD Question CFPB’s Approach in Its Guidance on Auto Lending, (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nada-and-namad-question-cfpbs-approach-in-itsguidance-on-auto-lending-199444951.html [https://perma.cc/9LVD-TX5G] (discussing auto
dealer associations describing the guidance as an “anti-competitive approach” that will “only
weaken the consumer’s ability to secure financing at the lowest possible cost”); Kim B. Perez,
The CFPB Indirectly Regulated Lending Through Auto Dealers, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 399,
400 n.7 (2013) http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1375&context=nc
bi [https://perma.cc/A2QB-9ABW] (collecting letters from senators and congressmen).
21
Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018).
22
Arguably, agencies had some warning about the position the GAO might take. In 1997,
the GAO opined on whether a National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan was a
rule for CRA purposes; that opinion used reasoning fairly similar to the recent opinions.
18
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only documents published in the Federal Register, and not even all of those.23
Because the deadline for introducing a CRA resolution is 60 session days after
the agency sends the rule to Congress, the CRA window is open for countless
past agency guidance documents.
Some commenters have taken the position that the GAO is simply
mistaken. For example, Professor David Zaring argues that a “rule” is
something that “prescribe[s] law or policy,” and general guidance documents
do not.24 But a statement that is “designed to implement . . . policy” is also a
rule, and that description seems broad enough to cover most guidance
documents. In any case, this argument is unlikely to dissuade both legislators
from introducing CRA resolutions attacking guidance documents and
Congress from passing those resolutions.
We argue in this essay that, in fact, CRA resolutions to nullify these
guidance documents will be ineffectual. The CRA is truly a tool meant for
defeating legislative rules. That power is important, no doubt. But CRA
resolutions to nullify past policies that an agency might not have submitted for
congressional review will, we argue, have no effect on the agency’s actual
policy and activities. Further, understanding why the CRA’s effect is limited
will illustrate certain limits on the meaning of the “no reissuance” rule.
III. DISAPPROVAL OF POLICY STATEMENTS
A. Character of Policy Statements and Guidance Documents
We begin with the practical realities of guidance documents and policy
statements. It is fairly well understood what these documents do, and what they
do not do. Pure guidance documents might inform the public about the
agency’s policy priorities, its plans for enforcement, its forecasts about the
direction of regulatory policy, its expectations for the conduct of regulated
Letter from Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to Senators
Ted Stevens, Frank H. Murkowski, and Don Young, U.S. Senate (Jul. 3, 1997), (on file with
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., https://www.gao.gov/decisions/cra/tongass.pdf). That the
respective agencies had not sent the leveraged lending guidance or the auto lending bulletin
for review suggests agencies have not been observant on this point.
23
See KRIS NGUYEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-436T, OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF REGULATORY AND GUIDANCE
PRACTICES 13 (2018), where the GAO reviewed CRA compliance for significant rules and
found it was at around 75%. Presumably compliance rates were worse for less significant rules.
24
David Zaring, Guidance and the Congressional Review Act, THE REG. REV. (Feb. 15,
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/15/zaring-guidance-congressional-review-act/
[https://perma.cc/FL33-NUDH].
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entities, its understanding about prevailing economic conditions or technological capabilities, and more. It does not, however, establish rights or
obligations that are binding on the public or on the agency. Of course, disputes
frequently arise about whether an agency statement is truly just a policy
statement, or if it is actually a legislative rule, especially as agencies sometimes
mischaracterize their documents.25 But, assuming a document is a policy
statement, it does not grant an agency authority to act in accordance with such
policy: when the agency wants to take regulatory action consistent with a policy
statement, say by enforcing a regulation, the policy statement is neither a prerequisite for the action, nor sufficient authority for the action. Fundamentally, the
agency’s authority for the action depends on the underlying statute or regulation,
regardless of what the policy statement says.26 “When the agency applies [a
general statement of] policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to
support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”27
Thus, agencies’ inattentiveness in failing to submit policy statements
to Congress is understandable. Outside the CRA, any possible status of these
documents as “rules” has had little legal significance. These general statements
of policy are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking procedures under
the APA.28 They are not binding on the agencies or on regulated parties.29
Finally, under the APA, agencies are supposed to publish these policy
statements in the Federal Register, but incomplete compliance does not
typically result in serious consequences.30
25

See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Dept. of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 212-213 (D.C. Cir.
1999); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
26
A policy can change the landscape for enforcement, by providing notice to regulated
parties that particular types of conduct may incur penalties. But the policy would still not be
the legal justification for imposing a penalty; and conversely many forms of relief (injunctive
orders, restitution, compensatory damages) and often even penalties are available without an
agency’s having previously given warning through a policy statement.
27
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
29
See Clarian Health W., LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Manual
instructions constitute a policy statement . . . [because] they have no binding legal effect.”);
Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. Food and Drug Admin., 664 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (“[A]n FDA warning letter compels action by neither the recipient nor the
agency.”).
30
5 U.S.C. § 552(a). We do not mean to condone agencies’ failing to follow rigorously the
statutory requirement to publish their statements of policy. However, the most significant
legal consequence of a failure to publish a document is that the document cannot be the basis
for imposing adverse consequences on the public. A guidance document cannot be the
grounds for adverse consequences anyway. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 252.
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The auto lending guidance targeted by the CRA resolution illustrates
the character of policy statements. For purposes of this argument, we
distinguish between two aspects of the bulletin: an interpretation of ECOA and
a public notice about the Bureau’s views and enforcement plans. With respect
to the public notice (we address the interpretation below in Section IV), the
bulletin simply provides information about the Bureau’s views regarding the
risks associated with a certain mode of lending called dealer markup, and the
ways that indirect lenders can mitigate these risks.31 The bulletin points out that
dealer markup may result in disparate impact in loan pricing and it warns
indirect auto lenders that they “may be liable” if they allow dealer markup and
the markup results in prohibited disparities.32 The bulletin also urges lenders to
“take steps to ensure that they are operating in compliance,” and it identifies
some steps that would help with respect to dealer markup.33
Given the warning, it would be unsurprising if the Bureau initiated an
enforcement action alleging that an indirect lender allowed dealer markups that
resulted in discrimination. Indeed, we could infer that dealer markup was an
enforcement priority. But to win such a case, the Bureau would have to persuade
a court that, given the facts, the lender’s activities violated ECOA; the existence
of the auto lending bulletin would not be so much as a thumb on the scale in the
court’s decision.34 With respect to the risk-mitigation practices that the bulletin
suggests, the Bureau clearly favored those actions. The bulletin itself does not,
and cannot, obligate a lender to implement those risk-mitigation practices.
Recent events underline the nature of guidance documents and policy
statements. Most of the federal agencies regulating the financial industry issued
statements affirming that guidance documents are not binding. The joint
statement from the prudential regulators (the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration)
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau asserts that, as we have
explained above, “supervisory guidance outlines the agencies’ supervisory
expectations or priorities and articulates the agencies’ general views regarding
appropriate practices for a given subject area.”35 Furthermore, “any citations
31

Bulletin, supra note 19 at 3-5.
Id. at 3.
33
Id. at 4.
34
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Unlike legislative rules, nonbinding agency statements carry no more weight on judicial review than their inherent
persuasiveness commands.”).
35
Interagency Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/agencies-iss
ue-statement-reaffirming-role-supervisory-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/RBX5-Y3EU].
32
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will be for violations of law,” rather than for “a ‘violation’ of supervisory
guidance.”36 The Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission also issued
a statement asserting that the Commission has long said its staff guidance is
not binding or legally enforceable.37
B. The Ineffectiveness of the CRA as to Policy Statements
The nature of policy statements makes a CRA resolution rather useless.
Let’s suppose, for purposes of argument, that a CRA resolution was successful
in blocking the Bureau from maintaining its auto lending policy statement.
Then the Bureau could still bring an enforcement case based on dealer markup.
Just as the policy statement did not justify or authorize such cases, the absence
of the policy statement would not bar them. The facts of a given case would
make the conduct a violation, or not, depending on the content of ECOA and
Regulation B—even in the absence of the policy statement. Additionally, the
Bureau could, in the enforcement action, encourage the sorts of company
policy that the policy statement recommended.38 For example, the Bureau
could reach a settlement in which the defendant promises to adopt those
policies; the Bureau could ask for an injunction requiring those steps; or it
could accept a more lenient penalty on the basis of a company’s policies along
those lines. An agency does those things on a case-by-case basis, and it could
keep doing that without the policy statement.
As a practical matter, for a regulated entity it often may not seem like
there is much difference between a regulation and a policy statement. If the
Bureau says it wants auto lenders to impose certain controls on dealer markup,
a typical lender might not think of that suggestion as optional.39 After all, even
36

Id. The tone of the statement suggests that perhaps the prudential regulators have
occasionally overplayed the role of their guidance documents, and maybe examiners actually
have treated guidance as binding. That behavior would not be surprising, or inconsistent with
our arguments. Supervisory agencies frequently issue directives and instructions to regulated
institutions that carry special weight because of the supervisory role and authority.
37
Jay Clayton, Statement Regarding SEC Staff Views, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-091318 [https://perma.
cc/6PCM-XU8E].
38
Perhaps if a policy statement described a rubric for enforcement prioritization, a CRA
resolution could block the agency from prioritizing enforcement cases in that particular way.
It would be easy for an agency to sidestep this use of the CRA, so as to render the resolution
ineffectual.
39
See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 253 (“[W]hile regulated parties may feel pressure to
voluntarily conform their behavior because the writing is on the wall about what will be
needed to obtain a permit, there has been no ‘order compelling the regulated entity to do
anything.’”).

468

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

if in principle a company has the right to argue that its dealer markups are legal,
the expense of the fight and the uncertainty of the outcome might make it
utterly impractical. An agency’s pronouncement that it thinks a certain practice
could be a violation will often be enough to end the practice.40
Still, there is a key difference between that dynamic and the impact of
a genuine legislative regulation. For example, the Bureau adopted a legislative
rule prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration clauses, and a CRA
resolution disapproving that rule became law.41 Absent the arbitration rule,
there is no rule generally prohibiting class-arbitration waivers. So a company
can confidently include those waivers in its consumer finance contracts, and
continue to use them. By contrast, suppose the CRA resolution against the auto
lending bulletin passes. We doubt any company will be confident that, because
of the CRA resolution, it can use dealer markups freely.42
We are not the first to observe these characteristics of policy
statements. However, we believe it is important to recognize the full
implications with respect to the CRA. A policy statement might be a rule; the
CRA might entitle the majority to pass a resolution disapproving the rule using
expedited procedures; and the resolution might then wipe the policy statement
out, as though it had never been. Nothing in the real world would change as a
result—either for the agency or for regulated entities.
Finally, looking to the text of the CRA, it is consistent with this
discussion, and does not suggest that a CRA resolution should have any
significance for a policy statement. The language that the CRA mandates for a
40

For example, in 2013, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency jointly issued guidance that said deposit advance loans pose
risks to bank safety and soundness, and indicated they would scrutinize such products
carefully during supervisory examinations. Guidance on Supervisory Concerns and
Expectations Regarding Deposit Advance Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,552 (Nov. 26, 2013).
According to the American Bankers Association, banks heeded the warning, and all but one
bank stopped offering the product entirely. Small Dollar Credit, AM. BANKERS ASS’N 5 (Apr.
2017), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Documents/SmallDollarWhitePaper2017Apr.pdf.
41
See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg.
33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040); Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No.
115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017) (invalidating the rule).
42
Lenders may have more freedom to use dealer markup, because the new leadership at the
Bureau may no longer believe dealer markup is illegal and may not want to take enforcement
action against markup policies. If so, what matters is that the views of Bureau leadership
have changed—not that a CRA resolution affirmed the new views. On the other hand, ECOA
violations are, in principle, subject to private rights of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e). Just as
the existence of the Bureau’s policy statement would have been of only marginal benefit for
a plaintiff’s proof in a case involving dealer markup, the disappearance of the policy
statement does not undermine such a case.
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resolution makes such a resolution irrelevant for policy statements because the
resolution has to say the subject rule “shall have no force and effect.”43 A
policy statement, by its very nature, has no legal force or effect.44 Similarly,
while “[a]ny rule that takes effect and is later made of no force and effect by
enactment of a joint resolution . . . shall be treated as though such rule had
never taken effect,” a policy statement is not “made of no force and effect” by
a CRA resolution.45 A policy statement had no force and effect in the first
place. The reference to “tak[ing] effect” seems, superficially, like it could be
relevant to policy statements; an agency might speak of a policy’s “effective
date,” meaning the point after which the agency would begin acting in
accordance with the statement. However, given the repeated usage of “force
and effect,” that is evidently not the sort of “effect” that the CRA means.
Nor does the “salting the earth” provision in the CRA have any
consequence for a policy statement. The Bureau asserted that, thanks to that
provision, the CRA resolution about the auto lending policy statement “prohibits
the Bureau from ever reissuing a substantially similar rule.”46 However, the
“salting the earth” provision only says, “[a] rule that does not take effect (or does
not continue)” due to a CRA resolution “may not be reissued in substantially the
same form.”47 This restriction has no import for a policy statement, because the
agency could all along have acted in the same way without issuing the statement.
For a legislative rule, issuance is a key step without which the rule has no effect.
For a policy statement, issuance is simply a convenient way to provide
information.48
To be clear, Congress can, of course, restrict how an agency carries out
its policy preferences, including how it prioritizes enforcement. One common
43

5 U.S.C. § 802(a).
At most, the agency must provide an explanation for declining to follow its policy
statement. But the bar for such an explanation is not high. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm’n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming agency’s decision to
rely on old policy statement instead of current one for reasons of “administrative
convenience” and finding that “‘[p]olicy statements’ differ from substantive rules that carry
the ‘force of law,’ because they lack ‘present binding effect’ on the agency”)
45
§ 801(f).
46
Statement of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection on enactment of S.J. Res. 57,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 21, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/statement-bureau-consumer-financial-protection-enactment-sj-res-57/ [https://per
ma.cc/M5CX-3UVP] (providing statement from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Director, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau).
47
§ 801(b)(2).
48
At most the CRA would prohibit the agency from issuing the policy statement—an
outcome that would mean the agency could not tell the public about beliefs, policies, or
priorities even though it could implement them.
44
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tool is limiting language in appropriations. For example, appropriations laws
have repeatedly prohibited the Department of Justice from spending funds to
prosecute certain types of crime involving marijuana.49 Another appropriations
law restricted the Department of Energy from implementing a statutory
provision under which, otherwise, it was supposed to limit sales of
incandescent light bulbs.50 We are not arguing that limitations like these are
beyond Congress’s power. Rather, the point is that a CRA resolution does not
impose such limitations. CRA resolutions have specific language and a specific
purpose, to prevent the subject rules from having “force and effect.” That
language is about legislative rules, not policy statements.
In sum, a CRA resolution disapproving a policy statement is a fairly
hollow exercise from a legal point of view. The resolution may have some
value as a rhetorical tool in political debates. To be sure, a very large number
of agency documents are purely policy statements and expressing disapproval
via a CRA resolution may be a useful way to send a message—to the agency
or to voters—about an agency’s policy. However, there is nothing that a CRA
resolution about a policy statement would prevent an agency from doing, and
no protection that it would provide to a regulated party.
IV. DISAPPROVAL OF INTERPRETIVE RULES
An analogous argument can be made about many interpretive rules.
Textually, the argument is essentially the same. A CRA resolution prevents a
rule from having “force and effect”; and myriad cases have said that
interpretive rules have no binding legal force.51
Of course, a subset of interpretive rules have, according to the Supreme
Court, “the force of law.” These are interpretations from agencies that have the
authority to speak with that force on certain ambiguous statutory provisions, and
that the agencies have issued through a “relatively formal administrative
procedure” appropriate for interpretations having legal force.52 The strength of
49

See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538 (2018).
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L 114-113 § 312, 129 Stat. 2419 (2016).
There is no principled reason that restrictions like these could not go into other laws;
appropriations bills are attractive mainly because they are relatively unlikely to attract a
filibuster or veto.
51
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (“Interpretive rules do
not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory
process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979) (“A court is not required to give effect to an interpretative
regulation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
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that characterization in Mead illustrates the converse as well, that very many
interpretive rules do not carry the force of law.53 Just like policy statements,
these rules can be regarded as not having “force and effect” under the CRA, so
that CRA resolutions do not really affect them.
The CFPB’s auto lending bulletin is a good illustration for this point as
well. The bulletin explains what it means to be a “creditor” under ECOA.54
Based on this interpretation, the bulletin describes two sets of credit practices
that, if an indirect lender used them, would “likely” make the lender a
“creditor” under ECOA.55 Whether these observations in the bulletin are
correct depends on the content of ECOA and Regulation B. We take for granted
that the bulletin would not deserve Chevron deference. Were the Bureau to take
enforcement action asserting a lender was a creditor of the type described in
the bulletin, the Bureau would not be able to rely on the bulletin itself as the
authority for the proposition. On the other hand, if the bulletin didn’t exist, the
Bureau would have the same ability to bring, and perhaps win, an enforcement
action using the same interpretation.56
Not only does the text of the CRA suggest a similar result for
interpretive rules as for policy statements, the functional arguments work the
same as well. The key similarity is that, just as with policy statements,
interpretations do not need to be rules. As noted above, an agency can prioritize
in a given way, or adopt a particular policy in the course of enforcement
actions, without having issued a policy statement. An agency can provide a
53

See Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“Interpretive rules do not carry the force and effect of law.”); see also Am. Mining Cong. v.
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a
“purported interpretive rule” that has “legal effect” is actually “a legislative, not an interpretive
rule”). Some circuits accord Chevron deference to rules that are more informal than would earn
deference in others. See Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2009) (comparing examples
in First and D.C. Circuits). This fuzziness at the Mead boundary does not alter the basic point
that many interpretive rules have no legal force. In addition, there might be special cases. For
example, an agency might have contracts that bind its contractors to respect its interpretations.
The possibility of such cases does not make the general proposition less valid.
54
Bulletin, supra note 19 at 2.
55
Id.
56
Of course, an agency can get Seminole Rock deference for an interpretation of its regulations
even if it presents the interpretation informally. See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). However, the courts have
not spoken of this deference as giving the force of law to such interpretations. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 28:8-12, Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15 (S. Ct. Mar. 27, 2019) (Chief Justice
Roberts expressing doubt that regulatory interpretations “have the force and effect of law”).
Indeed, the way Seminole Rock deference works belies the notion that any given articulation of
the interpretation has the force of law. The agency could state the interpretation in any format,
including in an enforcement action, and deserve the same deference. The deference does not
accrue to a particular interpretation arising in a rule having the force of law.
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given interpretation, without the force of law, in the course of an enforcement
action; in an informal adjudication on a non-enforcement issue; in an amicus
brief; etc. If the CRA prevented the agency from “issu[ing] [a] rule” stating
that interpretation, that restriction would not stop the agency from having the
same view or effectuating it in any of those other ways.
V. DISAPPROVAL OF LEGISLATIVE RULES
In conclusion, a CRA resolution matters only when the rule at issue
would have “force and effect” in the absence of the resolution. Legislative rules
in general have this character, and for them CRA resolutions are highly
consequential. Still, as we noted above, exactly what those consequences are
remains to be seen. In general, we can expect it to be some time before this
issue plays out. After all, the CRA resolutions passed in this congressional
session aligned with the policies of the Trump Administration; and current
agency heads are unlikely to test the boundaries of “no force and effect” or
“substantially similar.”
Future agency heads, in a new administration, may want to test these
boundaries. If so, the discussion here offers one way to think about the issues.
Every final rule that is legislative in the main contains some additional material
that amounts only to discussion of the agency’s policy views, explanation of
enforcement priorities, etc. Our argument leads to the conclusion that had the
agency issued those aspects of the rule separately, a CRA resolution would not
have affected them—because they would have had no force and effect in any
case. They should have no more force and effect when incorporated in a
legislative rule.57 If that is correct, then eliminating the legal force of the
legislative rule ought not to block the agency from implementing the policy
features that were not legislative. At a minimum, “substantially similar” should
measure only the legislative features of a rule.

57

Often, interpretations in a legislative rule will deserve Chevron deference. As we made
clear above, our arguments that CRA resolutions do not affect interpretive rules focused on
interpretations that do not deserve such deference.

